Process of designing robust, dependable, safe and secure software for medical devices: Point of care testing device as a case study by Tulasidas, S et al.
Journal of Software Engineering and Applications, 2013, 6, 1-13 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jsea.2013.69A001 Published Online September 2013 (http://www.scirp.org/journal/jsea) 
1
Process of Designing Robust, Dependable, Safe and Secure 
Software for Medical Devices: Point of Care Testing Device 
as a Case Study 
Sivanesan Tulasidas1, Ruth Mackay1, Pascal Craw1, Chris Hudson1, Voula Gkatzidou2,  
Wamadeva Balachandran1 
 
1Centre for Electronic Systems Research, School of Engineering & Design, Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK; 2Information Systems 
and Computing, Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK. 
Email: sivanesan.tulasidas@brunel.ac.uk, wamadeva.balachandran@brunel.ac.uk 
 
Received June 25th, 2013; revised July 26th, 2013; accepted August 3rd, 2013 
 
Copyright © 2013 Sivanesan Tulasidas et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Li-
cense, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a holistic methodology for the design of medical device software, which encompasses a new way of 
eliciting requirements, system design process, security design guideline, cloud architecture design, combinatorial testing 
process and agile project management. The paper uses point of care diagnostics as a case study where the software and 
hardware must be robust, reliable to provide accurate diagnosis of diseases. As software and software intensive systems 
are becoming increasingly complex, the impact of failures can lead to significant property damage, or damage to the 
environment. Within the medical diagnostic device software domain such failures can result in misdiagnosis leading to 
clinical complications and in some cases death. Software faults can arise due to the interaction among the software, the 
hardware, third party software and the operating environment. Unanticipated environmental changes and latent coding 
errors lead to operation faults despite the fact that usually a significant effort has been expended in the design, verifica- 
tion and validation of the software system. It is becoming increasingly more apparent that one needs to adopt different 
approaches, which will guarantee that a complex software system meets all safety, security, and reliability requirements, 
in addition to complying with standards such as IEC 62304. There are many initiatives taken to develop safety and se- 
curity critical systems, at different development phases and in different contexts, ranging from infrastructure design to 
device design. Different approaches are implemented to design error free software for safety critical systems. By adopt- 
ing the strategies and processes presented in this paper one can overcome the challenges in developing error free soft- 
ware for medical devices (or safety critical systems). 
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1. Introduction 
In the medical devices industry, software system failures 
can cost lives and result in fatal consequences. Software 
faults can arise due to the interaction among the soft- 
ware, the hardware, and the operating environment. Un- 
expected environmental changes lead to software abnor- 
malities that may have significant impact on the overall 
success of the system operation. Latent coding errors can 
surface at any time during the system operation and trig- 
ger faults in despite of significant effort having been ex- 
pended in verification and validation (V&V) of the 
software system. Extra efforts and spending considerable 
time in V&V are not enough to guarantee that a complex 
software system meets all safety, security, and reliability 
requirements [1]. 
Medical devices are particularly partial to interopera- 
bility issues due to incompatible data formats that lead to 
fatal consequences in the interconnected network environ- 
ment [2]. Point of Care testing (POCT) has been consi- 
dered as a case example because it meets the definition 
of the Safety Critical System (SCS). POCT is becoming 
an increasingly popular method over standard laboratory 
testing for diagnosis of infectious and genetic diseases. 
This testing methodology has shown many advantages 
such as diagnosis time reduction, cost reduction, porta- 
bility and better process control due to the automated 
nature of POCT in a hand-held or benchtop device. This 
reduces the risk of human error. The decrease in diagno- 
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sis time and rapid onset of treatment has been shown to 
improve patient outcome in emergency settings [3]. Dia- 
gnostic errors such as false positive results still occur, 
these result in poor patient outcomes due to unnecessary 
treatment or a delay in therapy which can result in a poor 
clinical outcome [4]. 
The POC device considered in this case uses the auto- 
mated process control for measuring parameters per- 
tained to medical diagnosis and it is used in a network 
connected environment, it meets the basic definition of 
the SCS. In this context, this paper shows how inherent 
complexity of software development process cycle for 
the POC system, can be project managed, designed and 
verified, using the methodologies, tools and system de- 
sign concepts that are followed in prototyping the POC 
device. These software system developing processes will 
help eliminate (or minimize) fatal consequences of er- 
rors made in software coding. 
In this paper, a holistic strategy of developing software 
(SW) for POC devices has been described. The paper 
contents have been divided into different sections. Each 
section addresses software development process of SCS 
with different aspects of the development cycle to pro- 
duce the product. In Section 2, a requirement eliciting 
methodology called Value Based Requirements Gather- 
ing is described. This process eliminates ambiguity in 
requirements. This is essential for developing any SCS. 
In Section 3, a system identification process that is used 
in the development of the POC system end-to-end archi- 
tecture is described. The system identification process 
will provide a basic abstraction view of the system that 
needs to be designed and to be implemented. In Section 4, 
the role of security design in the development of the SCS 
is explained. In the Section 5, operational scenarios used 
have been discussed. In Section 6, a cloud based archi- 
tectural strategy for POCT devices has been presented. In 
Section 7, justification and benefits for adopting recom- 
mendations from IEC 62,304 at the early stage of the de- 
velopment cycle are given. In Section 8, a process generat- 
ing testing strategy based on combinatorial design method- 
ology has been described. This methodology shows how 
less number of test scenarios guarantees 99% functional 
coverage as being opposed to spending time and re- 
sources on exhaustive testing. In Section 9, a recom- 
mendation for project management methodology that 
will potentially help eliminate software errors is discussed. 
Finally in Section 10, conclusions drawn are presented.  
2. Pyramid Requirement of Eliciting Process 
2.1. Issues with Current Process 
The FDA has analysed 3140 medical device recalls 
between 1992 and 1998, these reveal that 242 of them 
(7.7%) are traceable to software failures and of those 
software related recalls, 192 (or 79%) were linked to 
software defects that were introduced when changes were 
made to the software after its initial distribution [5]. The 
requirements were not fully understood by the down- 
stream development teams when changes were made. 
Figure 1 shows the traceability relationship between 
requirements and the downstream teams; design, soft- 
ware coding, testing and deployment teams. Also the fi- 
gure shows those portions of system with errors are in- 
creasing as development move from requirement phase 
to implementation phase. Note that the errors portion at 
the design and SW coding level are more than the errors 
portion at the requirement level. Less error at the re- 
quirement level will have a cascade effect at the last stage.  
It is very clear that by controlling and eliminating the 
errors at the requirement phase can be minimized at the 
SW coding level. At any given phase of development, the 
domain experts concentrate on their main deliverables 
and have limited awareness of information from previous 
phases. 
2.2. Pyramid Requirement Model  
In order to eliminate the errors that originate from the 
requirement phase, a methodology is presented here. It is 
known as “Problem Pyramid” modeling and is amalga- 
mated prior to creating any requirements. The require- 
ments become unclear because they are not tied to key 
measures. The pyramid modeling provides a way to as- 
sociate the key measures that the requirement needs to 
fulfill as shown in Figure 2. Each block is identified with 
a flow, which will help to create a meaningful and error 
free requirement. The requirement can be refined me- 
thodically by having the iterative refinement process (1: 
2: 3: 4: 5) until all the stakeholders are satisfied.  
It is very unlikely that a SW engineer who focuses on 
the “Program and Test” phase will detect an error propa- 
 
 
Figure 1. Error sources by development phases (layers) [6]. 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                 JSEA 
Process of Designing Robust, Dependable, Safe and Secure Software for  
Medical Devices: Point of Care Testing Device as a Case Study 
3
 
Figure 2. Problem-Pyramid [6]. 
 
gating from the “Requirement” phase. In order to have 
error free requirements, a methodology is presented which 
gives more importance to technical and business values 
that the requirement brings to the device development 
[6]. 
2.3. Requirement Pyramid Model Example  
An example of formulating an error free requirement for 
the POC device is shown in Table 1.  
In this example, the items (1) and (2) represent the 
problem domain; item (3) states the desired outcome; 
item (4) identifies the problem causes; item (5) states the 
requirement to accomplish the desired goal; item (6) states 
the design view of how the requirement can be imple- 
mented. With this kind of information it is very hard to 
make SW related coding errors because the requirement 
is tied into a measureable goal.  
Also note that this process increases visibility and ac- 
cess to actual requirements for the downstream team 
(SW development and verification teams). This will en- 
courage all the teams who are in the various vertical lay- 
ers to collaborate effectively to produce error free SW for 
the medical devices.  
3. System Design Process and Techniques 
3.1. Basic Building Blocks Identification 
Analysis of medical device recall reports in the FDA 
database in 2005-2006 show 109 software-related recall 
cases. The main recall reason for high risk device is 
design defect. Though the ratio of Class I devices with 
high risk is declining in 2006 compared to 2005 [7], the 
FDA data shows the repeatable occurrence of device 
recalls. There are directives and legislations have been 
proposed for software vendors for preventing product 
failure [8]. The design defects are the results of failure to 
understand the intent of the requirements by the design 
team and the lack of architectural view of the end-to-end 
system. By formulating the basic building blocks of the 
system that is being developed will help to design a fun- 
damental DNA of the system architecture. Once the basic 
building blocks are understood they can be organized or 
connected in such a way that a service (functionality) can 
be implemented to meet user requirements. 
The basic building block view (BBBV) of the POCT 
end2end system consists of P-Node, G-Node and P- 
Cloud (Figure 3). The P-Node is the representation of 
the POCT device. The G-Node is the representation of 
the gateway entity, which can be a smart-phone or a lap- 
top which is used to send measurement data to database 
server. The P-cloud is the representation of the secure 
private data cloud which has special interface access re- 
quirements such as UK’s NHS N3 [9] cloud infrastruc- 
ture and Canadian infoway [10]. 
 
Table 1. Application of pyramid process. 
(1) Problem: Lab user needs to input appropriate volume count when configuring the POC device 
(2) Current  measures: 
Multiple of 4 digit numbers were entered. 
Unable to enter 2 digits numbers 
(3) Goal  measures: 
Must enter only two digit number representing 
either mm3 or micro liter 
(4) Causes: 
Keypad entry does not differentiate entry for 
the volume and the process ID. One keypad 
input function is used for both entering the 
volume and process ID 
(5) Should be: Keypad should differentiate the entry for  volume and process ID 
(6) Design: Two separate keypads functions for inputting volume and process ID 
 
 
Figure 3. Basic build blocks of POC system. 
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In general there are two main root classes of mode of 
operation of the POC system. When a POCT request is 
initiated from the G-Node to P-Node, the mode of opera- 
tion is defined as user functional mode. When the data is 
sent from the P-Node to the P-Cloud after the test, the 
mode of operation is defined as reporting mode.  
User Functional (Control) mode  
Request from G-Node and response from P-Node 
Reporting mode 
Data sent only from P-Node to G-Node 
3.2. Isolating System Module Responsibilities 
Once the basic building blocks have been identified, 
isolate the functionalities and create functionality boun- 
daries i.e., assigning responsibilities to system compon- 
ents or architectural modules will create responsibility 
zones within the system architecture. A similar idea is 
encouraged in USE-CASE MAPS methodology [11] 
which is a popular system modeling process for complex 
architecture of interconnected systems. 
3.3. Creating Loosely Coupled Modules 
The loosely coupled system has many advantages in ser- 
vice oriented architecture [12-14]. This helps to imple- 
ment the system independently because of the nature of 
loosely coupled system.  
In practical terms, this kind of system architecture al-
lowed more stable and dependable products as the faults 
or fatal errors in one sub system will not impact the other 
system components. There is a vital need for these 
loosely coupled systems to interact and produce a desired 
end goal based on the system requirements. This com- 
munication between the loosely coupled system compo- 
nents should be of asynchronous messaging to maintain 
non-interdependency. The following paragraphs explain 
how this is implemented in the POCT architecture.  
The loosely coupling implementation in POCT devices 
is used both in software and hardware components. I2C 
interface (or similar interface) is used to connect these 
entities to share common data. This will provide the fol-
lowing advantages: 
 Independent systems operation (i.e., each module can 
function on its own) 
 The system has high fault tolerance or the faults can 
be contained within the sub system boundaries 
 The safety classifications (system portioning) can be 
applied easily as per the IEC 62304, the standard for 
medical device software life cycle process. 
 The system can be easily validated and verified as 
sub-system units and single End-2-End system 
 This type of system design paves the way to expand 
system (encouraging scalability) whenever require- 
ments changes or the POCT needs to interface with 
3rd party systems.  
When designing mission critical systems such as me- 
dical devices, the couplings (HW based or SW based) 
need to be minimized in order to eliminate be single 
point failures, which will impact whole system. This in- 
cludes assigning hardware architectures to multiple HW 
modules or platforms.  
Figure 4, shows the end2end topology of the POCT 
system which is being developed. The principle of iso- 
lating the functionalities and assigning the functionalities 
to multiple HW modules is followed in develo ping the 
topology. For e.g., the touch screen module and the con- 
trol system module are separated and connected via “Link 
3” as shown in Figure 4. 
The other important aspect is the identification of 
communication links, even within the HW components 
(e.g. the “Link 2”: connectivity between the SD card 
and Ethernet module). This will help to verify the func- 
tional correctness of these links during the system inte- 
gration tests, which are done by verification and valida- 
tion teams. 
3.4. Actuation Channels and Actuation  
Confirmation channels 
Cross verification of activation of control outputs signals 
that drives external peripherals (e.g. coils and actuators) 
need to be verified for all the outgoing actuations scen- 
arios. This kind of design is used in automated train con- 
trol systems. There are two groups of control channels, 
the actuation channel (ACH) and actuation confirmation 
channel (ACCH). A general system construct is shown in 
Figure 5 below. 
The “actuation channel” is responsible for activating 
 
 
Figure 4. End 2 End Topology. 
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(e.g. setting a voltage to an actuator) a peripheral. The 
“actuation confirmation channel” is responsible for veri- 
fying if the actuation was successful. In the POCT sys- 
tem design, this will be accomplished by an actuation 
control word which is a 16 bits variable and each bit (or 
group of bits) corresponds to a peripheral. This is be- 
cause some of the peripherals will need multiple input 
signals to activate them. The actuation confirmation chan- 
nel will have a corresponding word (a 16 bits entity) 
maps to the actuation control word.  
Table 2 shows an example of an 8 bit control word 
and an 8 bit conformation word. Bits 1 and 2 are repre- 
sentation of the control signals for a peripheral and bit 8 
in the conformation word represents the signal generated 
(state change because of the activation control signal). 
Two other such mappings are shown in the table. The 
state of the bits is shown next to each bit. For e.g., the bit 
8-logic LOW of the control word will activate pump 3. 
The conformation of the pump 3 activation will be sen- 
sed by the bit 2-logic LOW of the conformation word.  
There are many benefits of having this strategy; for 
example, detecting component failures before starting the 
tests, automated way of having component maintenance, 
postmortem of success or failures of the device operation 
 
 
Figure 5. Actuation and conformation channels. 
 
Table 2. Example of ACH and ACCH. 
Actuation CNTL 
Word 
Actuation  
Conformation Word Peripheral 
Bit 1 (H) 
Bit 2 (H) 
Bit 8 (H) Actuator 1 
Bit 4 Bit 4 Not used 
Bit 5 (L) Bit 5 (L) 
Bit 6 Bit 6 (H) 
Pump 2 
Bit 7 Bit 7 Not used 
Bit 8 (L) Bit 2 (L) Pump 3 
and provide guarantee in collecting the accurate test mea- 
surement data information and hence accurate diagnosis.  
The algorithm in Figure 6 shows a way of imple- 
menting the concept in the SW.  
The description of the each block and the data flow are 
shown below: 
[0001, 0002, 0003]: Before the activation process is 
called, default state of the peripheral is read which needs 
to be activated. The control conformation word which 
represents the default state of the peripheral is acquired 
via the ACCH. Information pertained to the peripheral of 
interest, is masked out from the control conformation 
word (also known as status word).  
[0004]: The control conformation word is verified for 
the expected state of the peripheral. 
[0012]: Reset attempts will be made if the expected 
state of the control conformation word is not correct. 
This process will be repeated for a predefined number of 
times.  
[0010, 0011]: If the reactivation attempts are failed, 
then and error log will be created, user will be alerted 
and the process will be aborted.  
[0005]: If the status word is read and confirmed, then 
the peripheral will be activated (to support a biological 
process, e.g. a coil is turned on to generate required tem 
perature).  
[0006, 0007, 0008, 0009]: The activation conformation 
 
 
Figure 6. Algorithm for peripheral activation. 
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word will be read and it will be verified that the activ- 
ation was successful. And the process will continue. 
[0007, 0010, 0011]: If the activation conformation word 
indicates that the peripheral was not activated correctly 
then the process will be aborted, an error log will be 
created and the user will be notified.  
4. Security Principles for Designing Safety 
Critical Software  
Listed are some of the guiding principles that should be 
followed in build security around the POCT devices. 
4.1. User Data 
All access to user data (measurement data and confi- 
guration data) must be approved by the user. This means, 
minimally that password protection must be respected on 
all interfaces that can access this data (even hardware in- 
terfaces). This includes protection of data removed or 
copied from the device (memory dumps, cloud server ac- 
cess etc).  
The POCT device is linked to a smart-phone (via 
Bluetooth) only when the smart-phone access is author- 
ized by the user. When the measurement data is sent over 
to the p-cloud, the data base link (M2M) access must be 
password protected. 
4.2. Security Threat Modeling  
A security threat model needs to be developed at the sys- 
tem level and the device level. The security threat model 
lifecycle changes all the time. Security is not absolute en- 
tity, and the attack coordinates change continuously. What 
was considered as good security counter measures yes- 
terday may not be applicable for tomorrow. 
4.2.1. Opportunity to Improve Security  
At any time there is an opportunity to improve security, 
at the end-to-end system level or at subsystem level or at 
component (SW and HW) level or at the SW API level or 
at data structure level, one should implement required 
changes. Relevant security requirements must be updated 
and they must be shared among all other stakeholders 
during device development. 
If a design team found an opportunity for improving 
security, that information must be documented. After ap- 
propriate impact analysis all the impacted teams must be 
informed about the changes needed. This needs to hap- 
pen regardless of bottom-up or top-down direction of the 
team hierarchy. 
4.2.2. Balanced Approach for Security  
In the POCT interconnected system, all the elements in 
the configured network must have individual security 
boundaries. All secrets stored on the device are unique to 
that device. This will prevent any compromises to the 
whole system in one device or a sub-system within the 
device. Development effort and cost should not be factors 
in deciding security protection strategies. A less costly de- 
vice and an expensive device must be treated equally 
with respect to security protection.  
4.2.3. Origin of Security Measures 
All device security measures originate from the device. 
Activation of security agent or security sub-system or 
security service which is responsible for security must 
start from the device. It will then use the security services 
provided by other collaborating entities in the system. 
For example, data transport security is a function of the 
infrastructure. Whenever the data is sent to the p-cloud 
from the G-Node, encryption of the data must be imple- 
mented using the security services provided by the infra- 
structure.  
4.2.4. Physical Security of on Board Data 
The POCT device will contain clinical test data which 
belongs to the user. If a POCT device is opened phy- 
sically, it should not provide any more access to the data 
contained within than is logically accessible through the 
user interface or external ports without opening the de- 
vice. Circuit level attacks on the device should be unfea- 
sible and the minimum bar to a hardware based attack on 
the user data should be a silicon level attack. 
4.2.5. Security through Obscurity  
Some security experts believe that security through ob- 
scurity as one of security measures which creates system 
design ambiguity to confuse security attacks. But this pro- 
cess of disclosing system design as insecure systems can 
lead to catastrophic security failure [15]. Automation sys- 
tems have relied on “security through obscurity” to solve 
computer attacks problems. But the tools needed to con- 
duct these attacks are easily obtainable for free and the 
potential consequences from an attack are large [16]. A 
system relying on security through obscurity may have 
theoretical or actual security vulnerabilities. Therefore, 
obscurity should not be relied upon as part of the security 
design. However, this can (and should) be used as a miti- 
gation strategy against unknown SW bugs in the imple- 
mentation. In general, anything that would divert any 
attempts of hackers in turning a SW bug into exploitation 
must be avoided. 
5. Some General Operational Scenarios That 
Are Very Specific to Security in the POCT 
Devices 
5.1. Processing Data in POCT Devices 
Scenario: Where will the “data process/generate results 
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stage” take place? The options are the POCT device or 
the server (p-cloud).  
The data process needs to take place at the server (the 
other end of the SSL tunnel) domain where the compu- 
ting power can be more than the POCT device.  
5.2. Clinical and Surveillance Data Collection 
Scenario: Will the data collection (clinical & surveil- 
lance) be collected before the results of the test are pre- 
sented to the user? 
The data collection (clinical & surveillance) will hap- 
pen when the test completion bit is set. This will be the 
trigger event for the smart-phone app to initiate the data 
collection. This means that the POCT device must have 
the capacity to store the collected data for during the test- 
ing process, which will simplify the SW implement- 
ation (Table 3).  
5.3. Access from Multiple Devices  
(Preventing Unauthorized Access) 
Scenario: How can we ensure a one-to-one relationship/ 
connection between a particular user and the testing de- 
vice? The one-to-one relationship can be guaranteed us- 
ing logic similar to Table 4. 
5.4. User authentication 
5.4.1. User Validation and User Identification 
There are two methodologies that can be used, “user 
validation” and “user identification”. User validation is a  
 
Table 3. Clinical and surveillance. 
IF ( 
(test completion bit set) AND 
(smart-phone has subscribed to the test completion event) 
) 
THEN { 
1-inform smart-phone about test completion 
2 – provide smart-phone with a pointer to access the test data memory
} 
ENDIF 
 
Table 4. Multiple device access. 
IF (an active session is present) AND (the user is not owner) 
THEN (Reject any new session creation) 
ENDIF 
Note that this can be configured as to how many concurrent sessions 
can be established by the owner. This can be configured using the 
services provided by OMAP (Operation, Maintenance and Provision-
ing) Module. 
process of comparing two data sets, while user identifi- 
cation is a process of using other data sets (data bases) to 
identify the user. Based on the environment the device is 
used, one can choose the authentication method. This 
selection can be set in the OMAP module. The result of 
this would be to set security info data (in the communi- 
cation protocol) sent between the POCT device and G- 
Node, to reflect this configuration.  
5.4.2. Authentication Using Biometric 
The biometric way of authentication process uses the 
user validation methodology. In this method, the user 
presents his or her credentials and the device compares 
what is presented with the user profile information stored 
in the device. 
5.4.3. Authentication Using Active Directory 
The active directory (AD) technology is an authentica- 
tion mechanism developed by Microsoft. When the user 
tries to log on to the device, a security challenge is com- 
municated from the AD sever to authenticate the user. 
The user can also log on to the device with the cached 
data (user profile info in the device) when there is no 
connection to AD. For the AD to work one need to have 
packet data network connectivity via cellular network or 
WLAN to the AD server.  
5.5. Safely Dispose of the Testing Device 
Scenario: Will the user be advised to safely dispose of 
the testing device once the test is complete? 
An approach to accomplish this requirement is that the 
smart-phone app (or the apps running on G-Node) needs 
to register with the POCT device for the completion 
event of the testing. This will enable the POCT device to 
send the testing event complete type packet to the smart- 
phone. Then the smartphone app can indicate the test 
completion to the user by a visual or sound indication via 
UI (User Interface).  
5.5.1. Mechanical Method 
If the user attempts to use the device cartridge again, a 
mechanism can be implemented to prevent this by me- 
chanical means. Some of the options that can be used are, 
using material properties of the cartridge and using paper 
microfluidics techniques that force only one time usage. 
5.5.2. On Device Usage Prevention Using SW 
If the whole POCT device needs to be disposed after one 
time use, then this can be done in SW; a usage indication 
bit can be stored to indicate that the device has been used 
once. This needs to be stored in the ROM area (non- 
volatile memory). Whenever the user attempts to use the 
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disposable device for a second time, the SW will prevent 
the user using the device.  
5.5.3. More Complex and Fail Proof Mechanism for 
Preventing (or Restricting) Device Usage 
Other alternative is to compare the device ID for the his- 
tory (in a database) before the device is used. For this, we 
need to have the network connectivity at the beginning of 
the test. The FDA provides guidelines or usages that are 
outlined for the device identification process [17]. This 
will also prevent any illegal resale of the POCT devices.  
6. P-cloud Architecture for Delivering Error 
Free SW System  
The following section explains the concepts of the p- 
cloud. The principle here is that the division of data boun- 
daries based on the usage model and it will guarantee to 
create an error free computing environment with respect 
to data handling. Each data repository can be accessible 
via separate gateways [Figure 7]. The gateways will 
connect to their partner entities in the G-Node which is 
usually a smartphone. In the case of the POCT, there are 
four gateways that get the access to appropriate data bases. 
These gateways have machine to machine (M2M) inter- 
face and user interfaces. The smartphone application de- 
velopers will create apps which will provide access to the 
gateway entities in the p-cloud.  
 
 
Figure 7. Cloud-Based data organization. 
The p-cloud consists of mainly 5 classes of data base 
repositories.  
6.1. Configuration, Measurement Databases 
The configuration database is a place for storing POCT 
provisioning data. This will be accessible to the POCT 
device (M2M link) and to various health care providers 
and lab associates. The measurement data base will have 
the data collected during the POCT and will only be ac- 
cessible to the POCT device. 
6.2. Data Mining Database 
The database for data mining will be used by the clini- 
cians for diagnosing. This database is an aggregated ver- 
sion of the measurement data base. The data mining data 
base will be accessible to data mining application devel- 
opers (data reporting tools) to provide suitable data portal 
for the clinicians. 
6.3. Execution Path Database 
The execution path database will collect operational data. 
The operational data base will help to debug field issues 
and it will help to log critical execution paths in the POC. 
The concept here is that the logged data will help to iden- 
tify any computational deviation for a particular POCT 
process. It is very essential that all the processes and their 
execution sequences in a medical device (or mission cri- 
tical device) should be clearly documented and assigned 
labels. In the POCT, a particular process or a set of proc- 
esses will provide measurement data that is pertained to a 
test. There will be a set of documented execution paths in 
the design that will accomplish the result. If the docu- 
mented execution paths differ during a POCT, the test 
will not be valid. The execution path data which will be 
logged in the data base will reveal any execution devia- 
tions against the expected execution for a given test. This 
process will not only help to remove any errors in SW 
coding during system acceptance testing (before launch- 
ing the system), but will also be an essential tool for field 
engineering team. By analyzing the execution data logs, 
the field engineering team will be able to pin-point any 
root cause of any issues during actual operation of the 
system. The execution log data base will be accessible to 
the field team and the POCT devices in the system.  
6.4. Deployment Database 
The deployment data base will have the information 
about the association of the POCT device and the G- 
Nodes that can access the POCT device. It is possible 
that the association between the POCT device and the G- 
Node can be one-one or one-many (one POCT device 
and many kinds of G-Nodes such as smart-phones, PC 
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and any user computing devices). The configuration data 
base will have only the configuration that is pertained to 
the POCT device and the deployment data base will only 
have the association data.  
The principle here is to segregate the data boundaries 
in different data bases and hence avoid any SW coding 
and execution errors.  
7. Benefits of Adopting IEC62304 at Early 
Stages of Development 
The IEC62304 was initially released in 2006 and it 
specifies the life cycle requirements for the medical de- 
vice software based on the safety criticality of the soft- 
ware. Currently the IEC62304 is a harmonized EU stan- 
dard, which is approved by the FDA as a recognized 
standard for SCS system development. It uses ISO14971 
to do risk analysis. There are three classes of the software 
[IEC62304: Section 4.3] based on the level of risks or 
hazard presented to the patient and users.  
 Class A: No injury or damage to health is possible  
 Class B: Non-SERIOUS INJURY is possible 
 Class C: Death or SERIOUS INJURY is possible 
The standard specifies the degree of SW development 
process rigor based on the established classification. It 
places additional focus attention on the use of third party 
SW, known as Software with an Unknown Pedigree 
(SOUP).  
The Table 1 [ISO62304: Annex A.2] shows the develop- 
ment process requirements by the safety classification. 
The Class C has additional process requirements compared 
to Class A and Class B.  
The hazard identification is done at the early stage of 
the development cycle by looking for opportunities to 
isolate and contain critical elements of the system to re- 
duce the number of critically classed components. The 
effective system design (error free system) and software 
partitioning is driven by two main goals; building safe 
and effective product and minimizing development com- 
plexity and cost. Thus the architecture segregation is the 
key to risk isolation.  
The software architecture breaks the medical device 
software down into smaller modules. These modules have 
a defined function and can be classified based on the func- 
tions’ role in the system.  
Figure 8 shows the architectural partitioning of the 
POCT device that has been developed. Furthermore the 
segregation of software components provided a view of 
the Class C functional modules from the other modules.  
There are two main approaches that can be used to 
segregate the system, hardware approach and software 
approach which is tied directly to operating system 
parameters. The important operating system parameters 
are as follows: Task Isolation, Restricted memory access, 
CPU/time protection, Exception handling and Virtuali- 
 
Figure 8. Architecture partitioning and IEC62304 classi- 
fication. 
 
zation. If an embedded OS is used in the design, the first 
three parameters can be set easily. The exception hand- 
ling needs to be done at the code level. The virtualiza- 
tion helps to create a separate partition over the function- 
alities.  
Attempting to get compliance with the IEC62304 
development process has many benefits which includes 
the development of error free software. During the pro- 
ject cycle, a software development plan must be main- 
tained and it should reflect the changes and it must pro- 
vide a real picture of the activities. All the team members 
must be aware of the plan and they must follow the plan. 
Software risk assessment must be done based on the 
ISO14971 and risk should be mitigated. The risk mana- 
gement activities should be given the importance and 
must be performed during the design phase. 
The system integration test must be conducted at the 
early stages of the project to mitigate any interface issues. 
The device manufacturer must take full responsibility for 
the entire software stack (including SOUP) [IEC62304: 
Sections: 5.1.1, 5.1.5, 5.1.7, 5.2.2, 5.3.3 - 3.4, 5.3.6, 6.1, 
7.1.2, 7.1.3, 7.4.1 - 4.2 8.1.1 - 1.2]. All the known bugs 
in the SOUP must be enumerated and intended use and 
conditions for the SOUP must be stated. The risks need 
to be identified (by analyzing the failure modes) and 
mitigated for the SOUP portion of the software stack. 
The configuration management for the SOUP must be 
implemented. The importance of evaluating SOUP mo- 
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dules is mentioned in the standard very strongly.  
With these recommendations, delivery of the error free 
software for the medical device and the maintenance 
after the first product release can be managed.  
8. Using Combinatorial Design Methodology 
for Generating Smart Testing Vectors 
 The combinatorial design methodology will help to iden- 
tify [18-22] the basic and essential test vectors that are 
required for verifying the system. There will be many 
possibilities that can be validated. However it is not pos- 
sible to test all the possibilities within a given short cycle 
of testing available. Combinatorial testing is an adoptable 
methodology which is useful in a wide range of situa- 
tions to uncover software defects. It is based on the sta-
tistical process that while the behavior of a software sys- 
tem may be affected by a large number of factors, only a 
few factors are dominant in inducing software failures 
[23].  
There are two main reasons for the large number of 
software defects in the design and implementation of 
Safety-Critical Systems (SCS), system with complex re- 
quirements and absence of software verification tools. 
Exhaustive system testing which covers all the use case 
scenarios is hard with in the allocated testing time. Ma- 
nually identifying the highly probable complex combi- 
nation of inputs of the system under test is impossible, 
because of the combinatorial explosion in the great num- 
ber of states that an SCS can reach when it executes [24].  
The combinatorial design based approach offers a way 
of testing the system with fewer key inputs. This process 
will build structured variation into testing scenarios. The 
structured variation focuses on creating almost all the 
key subsystem behaviors. Most of the issues are triggered 
by one or two entities in the system and this process will 
engage all possible two way interactions (or combina- 
tions).  
Figure 9 shows a comparison between manual and the 
combinatorial testing process.  
Note that some of the combinations are not valid. They 
are called invalid pairs, and these can be removed based 
 
 
Figure 9. Benefits of combinatorial testing process. 
on the subject matter expert’s recommendation. Also a 
new pair can be inserted based on the partial knowledge 
of the system under test.  
There are numerous open source tools available. Fig-
ure 10 shows the output (test vectors generated) for the 
basic POCT system interconnectivity using a tool called 
HEXAWISE [25].  
Note that the tool has come out with 99 two way in- 
teraction scenarios out of 36,450 exhaustive test scenar- 
ios which are not possible to execute practically.  
9. Agile Project Management Approach in 
Developing SCS  
9.1. Project Management in IEC62304 
In the IEC62304, Annex B talks about the project man- 
agement strategies that are suitable for the developping 
medical device software. It references the ISO/IEC 
12207, which describes the three main development mo- 
dels. They are stated below:  
9.1.1. Waterfall Model 
This is a “once-through” strategy where the requirements 
are gathered at the beginning of the project and then the 
system is designed, implemented, tested and delivered. 
This has neither multiple development cycle nor interim 
software delivery.  
9.1.2. Incremental Model 
This is an “incremental” strategy where the requirements 
are elicited at the beginning and then it goes through a 
multiple development cycle with the possibility of in- 
terim software delivery.  
9.1.3. Evolutionary Model 
This is an ‘evolutionary’ strategy as contrast to the other 
methodologies; all the requirements are not defined at the 
beginning. It goes through a multiple development cycle 
in partnership with the customer (stakeholders) and de-
livers incremental interim software versions. The re-
quirements evolve as the software become mature.  
Note that in the first and the second methods the vali-
dation and verification is done multiple times, hence the 
test cases become very mature. This helps to develop ma- 
ture systems with virtually zero errors.  
9.2. Agile Project Management Process 
Agile project management process is very similar to the 
evolutionary model, which encourages interaction be-
tween individuals over useless processes and tools, in- 
terests in working software over comprehensive documen- 
tation and promotes customer collaboration over contract 
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Figure 10. The test vector generated from HEXAWISE. 
 
negotiation and Responds to change over, following a 
constant plan [26]. This methodology has 12 main prin- 
ciples [27], where the highest priority is to satisfy the 
customer through early and continuous delivery of valu- 
able software. This recognizes the fact that the change in 
scope is unavoidable and it provides a framework to de- 
liver high quality software. This is suitable for delivering 
medical software system with highest quality possible.  
If safety-critical systems require greater emphasis on 
activities, such as formal specification and requirements 
management, then an agile process will include these as 
necessary activities. Furthermore, agile methods focus 
more on continuous process management and code-level 
quality than the classic software engineering process mo- 
del [28]. In addition to the advantages of using Agile 
project management, it supports the requirement trace- 
ability in the SCS engineering domain, where agile trace- 
ability from functional and safety requirements is neces- 
sary to meet certification process [29]. 
10. Conclusions  
In this paper, a study of software development method- 
ologies and processes has been presented. These recog- 
nize that effectiveness in all the development phases is 
required in producing error free software. A requirement 
elicitation methodology, Value Based Requirements have 
been presented, which will eliminate any ambiguities and 
requirement errors. The key to successful error free soft- 
ware is to remove all the errors at the higher develop- 
ment phases.  
A system design methodology is shown which de- 
scribes the benefit of creating the basic system building 
blocks view of the end to end system. This process high- 
lights the importance of having a clear architectural view 
of the system. There are some key strategies such as, iso- 
lation of system modules, need for creating loosely cou- 
pled system and its benefits, actuation and actuation con- 
formation channel and an algorithm for implementation 
and they are presented. The goal of these approaches is to 
develop error free software system that can be used in 
medical diagnosis environment without any fear that the 
system is not dependable. These strategies will help pro- 
duce a product with highly predictable behavior.  
The role of security in SCS is presented, focusing on a 
few important topics; user data privacy, threat modeling, 
and process of improving security, using services of se- 
curity infrastructure, authentication and cryptography. 
Some of the operational scenarios pertained to the opera- 
tion of the POCT device may cause security risks and the 
process of mitigating those risks is presented. 
A cloud-based architecture is presented for the purpose 
of storing five types of data that are relevant to the POCT 
system. A gateway for data access concept is described. 
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This will separate the implementation of the data base 
design and the associated applications. The segregation 
will provide data boundaries that will eliminate any soft- 
ware implementation errors; hence the system will be 
dependable for SCS (or medical system) operations.  
The compliance of the IEC62304 will make the system 
more dependable with zero errors as discussed.  
The process of smart testing based on the combinato- 
rial design methodology is explained and its benefits are 
shown with an example using an open source tool.  
Finally the Agile project management process that can 
be used for delivering software incrementally is dis- 
cussed.  
These strategies and methods discussed will guarantee 
to deliver high quality SW code for safety and mission 
critical system, in particular, in the development of 
medical device software. These strategies can be used in 
conjunction with IEC 62304 or similar SCS standards.  
The processes and methods presented in this paper 
have many advantages over the traditional SW develop- 
ment processes. The Value Based Requirement eliciting 
process provides key value attributes which will directly 
resolve a real world problem. Because it provides a 
measurable attribute to the requirement, the implement- 
tation (i.e. the SW code) can be validated without any 
ambiguities. In other words the behavior of the SW can 
be described in terms of measurable requirement attrib- 
utes. Therefore a highly predictable system will be de- 
veloped using these processes.  
The actuation and actuation conformation channels in 
the POCT device control will guarantee that all the ac- 
tuators are checked before any bio medical process is 
initiated. This will eliminate any measurement errors that 
may interfere with medical diagnosis.  
The existing medical devices in the market today are 
sold as individual medical devices as being opposed to 
medical device systems. The system (Section 6) de- 
scribed in this paper has infrastructure entity and device 
entity, which is an end-2-end architecture for deploying 
POCT devices. Because the infrastructure is architected 
mainly for carrying POCT type of devices, the architect- 
ture entities are customizable to implement the POCT 
requirements.  
The application developers who are interested in cre- 
ating smartphone applications can focus on individual 
gateways, which are architected to deliver only one ser- 
vice functionality. This will eliminate any unwanted cou- 
pling that may occur between the applications. 
The combinatorial testing process will help contain 
any software defects before the product launches or main- 
tenance upgrades. This can be done with fewer resources 
and relatively less testing time than the traditional testing 
processes. 
Finally, the agile project management process will 
enable device SW vendors to manage constantly chang- 
ing requirements effectively, and deliver mature SW im- 
plementations.  
REFERENCES 
[1] A. N. Srivastava and J. Schumann, “Software Health 
Management: A Necessity for Safety Critical Systems,” 
Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering, 2013, 
pp. 1-15, In Press. 
[2] S. Wang, A. Ayoub, R. Ivanov, O. Sokolsky and I. Lee, 
“Contract-Based Blame Assignment by Trace Analysis,” 
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Conference on 
High Confidence Networked Systems, Philadelphia, April 
2013, pp. 117-126. doi:10.1145/2461446.2461463 
[3] R. H. Birkhahn, E. Haines, W. Wen, L. Reddy, W. M. 
Briggs and P. A. Datillo, “Estimating the Clinical Impact 
of Bringing a Multimarker Cardiac Panel to the Bedside 
in the ED,” The American Journal of Emergency Medi- 
cine, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2011, pp. 304-308.  
doi:10.1016/j.ajem.2009.12.007   
[4] L. V. Dommelen, F. H. V. Tiel, S. Ouburg, et al., “Alar- 
mingly Poor Performance in Chlamydia Trachomatis 
Point of Care Testing,” Sexually Transmitted Infections, 
Vol. 86, No. 5, 2010, pp. 355-359.  
doi:10.1136/sti.2010.042598 
[5] J. M. S. Alonso and D. M. M. Pereira, “Medical Software 
Requirements at the New Cuban Regulations for Evalu- 
ation and State Control of Medical Devices,” IFMBE 
Proceedings on Biomedical Engineering CLAIB, Habana, 
16-21 May 2011, pp. 433-435. 
[6] R. F. Goldsmith, “Discovering Real Business Require- 
ments for Software Project Success,” 2004 
http://www.ebookmall.com/author/robin-f-goldsmith 
[7] Y. Yan, S. Liu, Q. Zhang and H. Wu, “Analysis of Medi- 
cal Device Recall Reports in FDA Database in 2005- 
2006,” IFMBE Proceedings, 2013, pp. 766-769. 
[8] S. Kierkegaard and P. Kierkegaard, “Danger to Public 
Health: Medical Devices, Toxicity, Virus and Fraud,” 
Computer Law and Security Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, 
pp. 13-27. doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2012.11.006 
[9] National Health Service Infrastructure UK.  
http://n3.nhs.uk/technicalinformation/n3networkoverview
.cfm 
[10] Canada Health Infoway, 2012.  
https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/index.php/about-infow
ay  
[11] A Notation to Describe Behavior of Complex and Dy- 
namic Systems, University Of Ottawa.  
http://www.usecasemaps.org/aboutucms.shtml 
[12] G. Holl, D. Thaller, P. Grünbacher and C. Elsner, “Man- 
aging Emerging Configuration Dependencies in Multi 
Product Lines,” Proceedings of the 6th International 
Workshop on Variability Modeling of Software-Intensive 
Systems, Leipzig, 25-27 January 2012, pp. 3-10. 
[13] B. Ostermaier, M. Kovatsch and S. Santini, “Connecting 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                 JSEA 
Process of Designing Robust, Dependable, Safe and Secure Software for  
Medical Devices: Point of Care Testing Device as a Case Study 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                 JSEA 
13
Things to the Web Using Programmable Low-Power 
WiFi Modules,” Proceedings of the 2nd International 
Workshop on Web of Things, San Francisco, 16 June 2011. 
[14] C. Ruz, F. Baude and B. Sauvan, “Component-Based 
Generic Approach for Reconfigurable Management of 
Component-Based SOA Applications,” Proceedings of 
the 3rd International Workshop on Monitoring, Adapt- 
ation and Beyond, 2010, pp. 25-32. 
[15] S. Bono, A. Rubin, A. Stubblefield and M. Green, “Se- 
curity through Legality,” Communications of the ACM, 
Vol. 49, No. 6, 2006, pp. 41-43.  
doi:10.1145/1132469.1132499 
[16] M. McKay, “Best Practices in Automation Security,” 
IEEE Cement Industry Technical Conference, San Anto- 
nio, 14-17 May 2012, pp. 1-15. 
[17] US Food and Drug Administration Certification Authority. 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationan
dGuiance/UniqueDeviceIdentification/ucm054169.htm 
[18] M. F. Johansen, Ø. Haugen and F. Fleurey, “Bow Tie 
Testing—A Testing Pattern for Product Lines,” Proceed- 
ings of the 16th European Conference on Pattern Lan- 
guages of Programs, Irsee, 13-17 July 2011.  
[19] V. A. de Santiago Júnior and N. L. Vijaykumar, “Gene- 
rating Model-based Test Cases from Natural Language 
Requirements for Space Application Software,” Software 
Quality Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2012, pp. 77-143. 
doi:10.1007/s11219-011-9155-6 
[20] J. Natarajan, J. Wells, A. Chatterjee and A. Singh, “Dis- 
tributed Comparison Test Driven Multiprocessor Speed- 
tuning: Targeting Performance Gains under Extreme 
Process Variations,” Proceedings of the Asian Test Sym- 
posium, 20-23 November 2011, New Delhi, pp. 154-160.  
[21] C. Nie and H. Leung, “The Minimal Failure-Causing 
Schema of Combinatorial Testing,” ACM Transactions on 
Software Engineering and Methodology, Vol. 20, No. 4, 
2011, Article No. 2. doi:10.1145/2000799.2000801 
[22] I. Segall, R. Tzoref-Brill and E. Farchi, “Using Binary 
Decision Diagrams for Combinatorial Test Design,” Pro-
ceedings of the 2011 International Symposium on Soft-
ware Testing and Analysis, Toronto, 17-21 July 2011, pp. 
254-264. doi:10.1145/2001420.2001451 
[23] R. N. Kacker, D. R. Kuhn, Y. Lei and J. F. Lawrence, 
“Combinatorial Testing for Software: An Adaptation of 
Design of Experiments,” Measurement, 2013, In Press.  
doi:10.1016/j.measurement.2013.02.021 
[24] M. I. Capel and L. E. M. Morales, “A Formal Composi- 
tional Verification Approach for Safety-Critical Systems 
Correctness: Model-Checking Based Methodological Ap- 
proach to Automatically Verify Safety Critical Systems 
Software,” Proceedings of the 14th International Con- 
ference on Enterprise Information Systems, Wroclaw, 28 
June 2012, pp. 105-112.  
[25] Test Design Tool, HEXAWISE.  
https://app.hexawise.com/ 
[26] Agile Project Management Process Alliance, 2013. 
http://www.agilealliance.org/the-alliance/the-agile-manife
sto/ 
[27] Agile Project Management Process, 12 Principles, 2013. 
http://www.agilealliance.org/the-alliance/the-agile-manife
sto/the-twelve-principles-of-agile-software/ 
[28] K. Gary, A. Enquobahrie, L. Ibanez, P. Cheng, Z. Yaniv, 
K. Cleary and J. Heidenreich, “Agile Methods for Open 
Source Safety-Critical Software,” Software: Practice and 
Experience, Vol. 41, No. 9, 2011, pp. 945-962.  
doi:10.1002/spe.1075  
[29] M. Taromirad and R. F. Paige, “Agile Requirements 
Traceability Using Domain-Specific Modelling Lan- 
guages,” Proceedings of the 2012 Extreme Modeling 
Workshop, Innsbruck, 1 October 2012, pp. 45-50. 
 
 
